In
his book, The Russian Art of War, How the
West Led Ukraine to Defeat, Jacques Baud argues that Russia's Special
Military Operation in Ukraine is based on and legally justified by the UN Responsibility
To Protect (R2P) doctrine, in this case to protect minority Russian speakers
from alleged abuse and discrimination at the hands of the Ukrainian government.
Baud's credentials include work within Swiss strategic intelligence, UN
peacekeeping and NATO, though his "patently false" labeling of the
poisonings of Russia dissidents like Navalny as fake has earned him, at least
in one analyst's estimation, the title of "Putin's lackey". ( https://medium.com/@marcdauphin/you-asked-me-to-tell-you-about-why-jacques-baud-is-putins-lackey-0cb194ca90d4) Nevertheless,
the resemblance of his justification for Putin's invasion to arguments commonly
made in objection to aiding Ukraine in current discourse requires a response. Baud
identifies the triggering event for repression of Russian speakers in February
2014 as a "coup d'état" leading the "Russian-speaking population"
to rise up "en masse" (p. 77) . That "coup" was in fact the
Revolution of Dignity, and it was the people of Ukraine who first rose up to protest
against the corrupt and Putin-allied Yanukovych government's last minute reneging
on plans to move toward joining the European Union. At least 68 protesters died
before parliament prohibited the use of force against them, removed Yankovych,
appointed an interim president and installed a new provisional government. (The Gates of Europe, Serhii Plokhy, p.
339) All that was done by Ukraine's elected parliament - hardly a
"coup" - the word footnoted as
a fact when in reality it was just how Putin and also American political
operative Paul Manafort sought to spin the downfall of their disgraced mutual client.
(https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html) Manafort
had first come up with a version of his divide-and-conquer political strategy
for Ukraine based on language divisions after the earlier Orange Revolution of
2004 where Yanukovych was caught red-handed fixing the election results and was
defeated in a supreme-court ordered revote. "[Manafort] was pushing something like
the idea that there are two types of Ukrainians—there are Ukrainians-speaking
Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians" (Tetiana Shevchuk,
Anti-Corruption Action Center, Kyiv, op. cit.) Coincidentally
or not, Manafort's strategy ran parallel to a "budding Russian
intelligence operation that was engaging in 'manipulation of issues like the
status of the Russian language to stoke a separatist rebellion,'" also
according to the New York Times Magazine article, based on leaked US embassy
cables. As
in other cases, political opportunism based on divisions works best when there
are real divisions to exploit, and Ukraine had no shortage of those, especially
that between the more Russian-speaking industrial east, the Donbas region in
particular, and the rest of the country. As Plokhy summarizes the subsequent
revolt in the east: "As in Kyiv, people in Donetsk were fed up with
corruption, but many in the Donbas oriented themselves on Russia, not Europe,
and hoped not for a corruption-free market economy but for a Soviet-era
state-run economy and social guarantees." (Gates. p. 343) So
there was real division, and a strong difference of opinion, though likely
inflamed by politicians like Yanukovych seeking to exploit it—which to be fair,
is just part and parcel of the modern, messy and often bitter political
process, one that we've seen in the West too, especially over cultural, ethnic
and identity issues. But,
did these disputes go beyond bitter politics to in any way justify intervention by a foreign power claiming to
protect a minority embroiled in the midst of an admittedly flawed and sometimes
violent, embryonic, erratic, halting, sometimes corrupt, sometimes saintly, one
step forward, two back, one sideways and maybe forward again—in other words quintessentially
democratic—process? The United Nations didn't seem to think
so. After
her April 2014 official visit to Ukraine, the UN Special Rapporteur on minority
issues, Rita Izsák reported that: The
overwhelming majority of those minority and other representatives whom I
consulted in all locations visited described harmonious inter-ethnic and
inter-faith relations and a legislative and policy environment that is
conducive to the protection of their rights, including cultural rights. (https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2014/04/statement-special-rapporteur-minority-issues-rita-izsak-following-her-official) And,
not only was the "legislative and policy environment... conducive to the protection of their rights"
— that is, they had access to and reasonable faith that peaceful political
processes could resolve their issues — but discrimination and violence were "rare"
- even with the charged atmosphere already present at that time: Most minority representatives described to me
conditions of non-discrimination in all spheres of life and acknowledged that
violence, intimidation or aggression against them on the basis of national,
ethnic or religious belonging are rare, even in these times of heightened
tension. And
no, it wasn't a whitewash either. Russian speakers' concerns were not ignored: "...ethnic Russians, spoke passionately
about their concerns over the language rights of Russian speakers and their
desire to see enhanced protection and anti-discrimination measures put in
place." In
other words, even though Russian speakers had very serious concerns about their
language and their rights, they sought a political/policy solution - that's
what you do in a democracy - not violence, insurrection or foreign
intervention. Izsák's report called for reforms, with better legal protections
for minority language speakers: "Immediate
steps must be taken to ensure ... that the law meets, to the fullest extent
possible, the needs and expectations of Ukraine's highly diverse and distinct
linguistic communities." Also
though, and significantly, the UN report acknowledged the importance and value
of Ukraine having a shared language to foster unity: "At the same time, Government
objectives of promoting the widespread knowledge and use of Ukrainian as the
national language are legitimate and
important to national unity." (emphasis added) Izsák's
report also condemns both censorship and the use of media for propaganda purposes,
and its link to violence: "media outlets and those who control media
content have a responsibility to accurately and objectively convey information
and to avoid any propaganda or misinformation which may incite unrest or violence." (emphasis added) Finally,
the Izsák's UN report summarizes both the problems facing Ukraine, and if there
was any doubt, the total unacceptability of violent solutions—including by
foreign actors: While
recognizing the legitimate concerns of minorities and their right to peaceful
protest and to freely express their opinions, it is my view that the current
human rights and minority rights situation and the civil and political,
economic, social and cultural conditions experienced by minorities cannot justify any violent actions or
incitement and support of those actions by any party, national or international.
(emphasis added) Yes,
there were issues, and still are, but by the UN's own report, they do not
justify violence, much less foreign intervention. Claiming otherwise had no
basis in fact, and has led to a profound abuse of the UN Responsibility to
Protect doctrine as justification for Putin's invasion. And
the consequences of that invasion demolished any already tenuous remaining claim
to be protecting Russian-speaking Ukrainians. As Yaroslav Hyrysak put it in Ukraine, the Forging of a Nation: Putin
declared war under the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking population of
Ukraine, but the reality is entirely different. The war is being waged mainly
in the Russian-speaking parts of the country and while claiming to protect the
Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, Putin and the Russian army are systematically
destroying it. Russian attacks and shelling of Mariupol, Odesa, Kharkiv and Kherson, are killing people
and destroying their homes. (p. 396) While
physically destroying the cities, home and lives of Russian speakers in
Ukraine, Putin and the Russian army are also "destroying the special
status of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine. One year after the
full-scale invasion, 45 percent of people who identified as Russian speakers or
bilingual report that they are now speaking more Ukrainian." Aided
by the continual decline of Russian as a world language since the collapse of
the USSR, Hyrysak sees the eventual fate of Russian in Ukraine as being similar
to other European minority languages as "just one minority language among
many. And so, Russian will experience the very fate that Russian and Soviet
officials tried to impose on Ukrainian. History loves a paradox. " As
in weakening NATO, it seems that Putin's war on Ukraine is actually harming,
rather than helping, the achievement of his goals. Baud
also cites the "10,000 civilian deaths in the Donbass" and self-defense
under Article 51 of the UN Charter (p 80), as justification for Russia's
Special Military Operation. The closest
reference within his footnotes may be the previously cited New York Times
Magazine article that refers to Donbas "where Kremlin-armed, -funded and -directed “separatists”
were waging a two-year-old shadow war that had left nearly 10,000 dead." Plokhy
cites 14,000 dead in Donbas by 2020 "on both sides of the divide" (Gateway p. 355), a number both more sobering and realistic,
including combatants from both sides and civilians, tragically but not surprisingly
caught up in a conflict waged amidst their homes and cities. Owen
Matthews in his Overreach, The Inside
Story of Putin's War on Ukraine, characterizes Kremlin claims that "Russia
was fighting a defensive war against Ukrainian 'genocide' of Russian speakers
in eastern Ukraine" as of "dubious veracity", though he notes Kremlin propaganda "was
relentless, and increasingly well packaged, and successfully convinced many
Russians," (p. 254) at least partly because they wanted to be convinced,
wanted to believe their soldiers were noble liberators, not invaders. The
10-14 thousand deaths in the war prior to Putin's full-scale invasion in February
2022 are tragic, even more so when they are exploited for propaganda—defying
common sense and even temporal causality—as justification for a war of
aggression for which they are not a concocted, fake cause, but a very real, horrendous
result. As
for the self-defense claim under Article 51 of the UN Charter, that would apply
to Ukraine defending itself, as a member of the United Nations. The so-called
Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics were illegally created by Russia, then
annexed. They were never recognized by the UN, and have no legal claim to
'defend' themselves, all the less so when the UN itself found, as noted above,
that conditions in Ukraine in 2014
could not "justify any violent
actions... by any party, national or international." The
UN report summarized much of what has gone tragically wrong in this conflict,
not unlike many others around the world and through history. An ethnic or
linguistic minority has legitimate concerns and those are exploited by others for
political, and in this case strategic/military objectives, often as not with
little or no relation to best interests of the aggrieved minority. Similar
to the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia prior to World War II taking cues from
Hitler as they attacked police stations and other government facilities to
commit and incite violence, the separatists in the Donbas region of Ukraine,
rather than pursuing the political and policy reform paths open to them, chose
violence at the behest of their preferred foreign master, Putin. Like the
Sudeten Germans and many others, they may discover the real motives of their
new master too late to avoid consequences utterly at odds with their
aspirations and likely tragically and painfully harmful to their people and
everything they hold dear. (0) COMMENTSWelcome to the discussion.
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